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Benjamin Marx, Sciences PoA recent literature emphasizes political economy factors behind the wave of administrative splits across the developing
world. While previous studies have focused on why some groups are more likely to obtain new administrative units, they
do not explain why vote-maximizing incumbents use this arguably less efﬁcient policy in the ﬁrst place. We contribute to
this literature by embedding administrative splits within incumbents’ broader electoral strategy of distributive policies. We
develop a model in which incumbents target local public goods to groups for whom this is a credible signal of commitment,
namely, those with a history of reciprocal relationship. When incumbents face increased electoral competition, however,
other groups require a stronger signal, which is emitted by the costly creation of new units that reduces the cost of future
transfers to those groups. We test our theory using electoral and public goods data from Senegal and ﬁnd robust support for
its predictions.n the past two decades, many developing countries have
signiﬁcantly increased the number of subnational units via
splits (Grossman, Pierskalla, and Dean 2017). The ubiq-
uity of this dramatic reorganization of the territorial structure
of states has led to a growing body of work on the determinants
of this policy. The current literature has rejected function-
alist explanations of the creation of administrative units—those
rooted in efﬁciency trade-offs—in favor of political economy
explanations, which are generally based on the electoral ben-
eﬁts that splits confer on national incumbents (Pierskalla 2016a).
We advance this line of reasoning by addressing a hitherto un-
answered question: why do incumbents provide groups with
new administrative units to begin with, instead of using other,
arguably more efﬁcient, distributive policies?
Previous work argues that national incumbents—especially
those facing heightened electoral pressure—pursue such re-
forms to create local public sector employment that both co-
opts local elites in newly created administrative units and
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esky 2009; Resnick 2014), reduces the bargaining power of
the periphery vis-à-vis the center (Grossman and Lewis 2014),
and increases the executive branch’s control of parliament
and the surveillance of the electorate (Hassan and Sheely
2017).
In addition to these advantages that the creation of new
administrative units confers on the incumbent, past work
has argued and empirically shown that incumbents facing
electoral pressure are rewarded by voters from newly created
units. Such voters strongly favor this policy because splits
reduce their distance to the administrative unit’s headquar-
ters and because it increases local control over central gov-
ernment transfers (Grossman and Lewis 2014) or because
targeted patronage steers the local economy (Hassan 2016).
Incumbents have used this policy to especially target mar-
ginalized groups (Kimura 2012) that place a relatively high
premium on new administrative units, due to a strong pref-
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(Grossman and Lewis 2014).
While existing studies undoubtedly increase our under-
standing of the dynamics of administrative unit splits, we
argue that they have not addressed the following core puzzle.
Since increasing the number of administrative units is costly,
and since the overall effect of such a policy on public service
delivery is somewhat ambiguous (Pierskalla 2016a), why then
don’t incumbents who want to lure certain voters simply use
an alternative electoral strategy—small preelection investments
in local public goods and promises of a sustained increase in
spending on those goods—that is highly valued by voters, ar-
guably more efﬁcient, and contributes unambiguously to de-
velopment? In other words, past work has generally ignored
the fact that incumbents have a menu of electoral strategies
to sway voters, and it is not straightforward why they would
choose to increase the number of administrative units rather
than to adopt a different targeting strategy.
We address this gap by proposing a new theoretical frame-
work, formalized in the appendix (available online), for un-
derstanding both the ubiquity and the differential use of ad-
ministrative unit splits in the past two decades. Our starting
point is that in low-information settings, voters search for
signals to determine politicians’ congruence. In settings char-
acterized by weakly institutionalized and often nonideologi-
cal political parties, congruence can be deﬁned by the extent
to which candidates will take the interest of constituents to
heart while in ofﬁce. In such settings, constituents generally
do not have strong attachments to (nonprogrammatic) po-
litical parties and thus vote for the party or candidate that
sends the most credible signal of congruence (Gottlieb and
Larreguy 2016). All parties understand the importance of such
signals, but incumbent parties are better positioned (relative
to opposition parties) to use distributive policies strategically.
In addition, when the level of electoral competition is sufﬁ-
ciently high, incumbents cannot simply rely on the votes of
those constituents who traditionally supported them to win
reelection.
Speciﬁcally, when facing increased political opposition in
the run-up to the election, incumbents have two main poli-
cies to signal to voters (and perhaps more importantly, as we
argue below, to their brokers in contexts where their coor-
dination capacity determines how voters respond to policy)
a future commitment to their welfare if they are reelected:
(1) small investments in local public goods and promises
of a sustained increase in spending on local public goods
in the postelection period and (2) new administrative units.11. Incumbents can employ additional strategies, such as power shar-
ing (Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015) or elites’ appointments to min-
isterial positions (Arriola 2013). These alternative strategies operate at the
This content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Incumbents prefer using local public goods, which are less
costly, but face a problem of establishing credibility with some,
but not all, brokers or the voters they coordinate.
We consider two group-level factors affecting the incum-
bent’s choice of preelection distributive policies: (a) the coordi-
nation capacity of brokers and (b) the history of the incum-
bent party’s targeting of a group, which affects the credibility
of promises of sustained spending on local public goods.Within
this framework, we formulate several hypotheses pertaining
to the incumbent’s policy choice. First, a vote-maximizing
incumbent has an incentive to only target areas where bro-
kers are strong enough to effectively coordinate votes around a
single candidate. Second, when targeting groups with strong
brokers, incumbents prefer to use promises of local public
goods, but these promises are only credible when their party
has a history of targeting local public goods to those groups.
When dealing with groups who have strong brokers but lack
such a history of targeting, the incumbent may need to in-
vest in a new administrative unit to credibly signal future con-
gruence.
The logic of this core hypothesis relies on the idea that an
incumbent party is either unconditionally congruent, strategi-
cally congruent, or noncongruent with respect to each voter
group. For those groups with whom it is unconditionally con-
gruent, promises of local public goods are credible because
the incumbent has already established congruence with the
group, and reneging on such promises would incur sufﬁciently
high reputation costs. Among these groups, promises of local
public goods are thus sufﬁcient to sustain an exchange equi-
librium, whereby the group maintains its electoral support
for the incumbent who, in turn, continues targeting the group
in the postelection period.
Conversely, for those groups with whom an incumbent is
strategically congruent, the incumbent seeks to attract votes
only when electoral contestation necessitates it. However, rela-
tively small preelection investments in local public goods and
promises of future transfers are not a sufﬁciently credible sig-
nal of postelection congruence. This is because both strategi-
cally congruent and noncongruent incumbents have incen-
tives to use this relatively low-cost strategy, though only the
latter have incentives to renege after the election. To credibly
signal to voters that they are indeed strategically congruent,
incumbents can invest in the creation of a new administrative
unit, but this investment is costly. Key to our argument is the
notion that, unlike public goods ﬂows that can be phased in or
out with relative ease, and unlike electoral promises that can
be reneged on at a relatively low reputational cost, the cre-
ation of an administrative unit entails (i) short-term upfrontnational level, while in this project our interest is in spatial variation in
targeting at a more local level.
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3. These administrative unit changes took place in anticipation of the
2009 local elections when Wade expected signiﬁcant electoral contestation
despite the results of the February 2007 presidential election. Due to those
surprising results, which the main opposition parties attributed to fraudulent
rolls, an audit of the voter rolls was requested, which Wade refused. In re-
Volume 81 Number 2 April 2019 / 000costs of setting up a new local administration, (ii) a reduc-
tion in the cost of providing local public goods to the ben-
eﬁciary groups in the future, and (iii) an increase in stable
ﬁscal transfers due to the relative stickiness of administrative
boundaries and ﬁxed unit-level outlays.
This variation in the ability of incumbents (relative to
opposition parties) to send a credible signal of congruence
leads to clear testable implications. First, incumbents should
use different strategies vis-à-vis different types of groups in
accordance with the argument outlined above. Second, mem-
bers of groups targeted with new administrative units should
update their beliefs regarding the incumbent’s congruence
and thus increase their electoral support for the incumbent
relative to nontargeted groups, namely, those groups who re-
ceive neither administrative units nor renewed promises of
continued spending on local public goods. Third, administra-
tive unit creation should be concentrated in settings where
incumbents face genuine electoral competition.
We test these predictions using ﬁne-grained original data
from Senegal. Senegal provides an ideal context to study the
strategic targeting of administrative splits and local public
goods as well as voters’ responses to the differential target-
ing policies of incumbents for several reasons. First, Senegal
is a young democracy exhibiting multiparty competition,2 in-
creased political contestation, and ample party switching and2. The Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) ended the long-ruling
period of the Socialist Party (PS) in 2000 to lose power to the Alliance for
the Republic (APR) in 2012.
This content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms group-level targeting (Koter 2013). Second, Senegal recently
underwent a series of dramatic administrative unit changes.
Following his reelection to a second term in 2007, President
Wade of the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) split a large
number of low-level local governments, communautés rurales
(or rural communities, henceforth CRs).3 By splitting exist-
ing CR units, Wade’s government created 62 new units in
2008 and 16 additional ones in 2010–11. These splits affected
18% of the country’s villages (counting only villages included
in an entirely new CR), as reﬂected in ﬁgure 1 and appendix
table A.5 (tables A.1–A.19 are available online).
In our empirical analysis, we ﬁnd robust evidence in
support of our model’s predictions. First, we show that the
incumbent party is using different policies to target differ-
ent groups. On the one hand, Wade’s administration is sig-
niﬁcantly more likely to target local public goods to a group
with strong brokers and a strong track record of a recipro-
cal electoral relationship—the Mouride religious brotherhoodFigure 1. CR changes in 2008. “Not in sample” corresponds to Dakar and St. Louis urban areassponse, the main opposition parties successfully boycotted the June 2007
legislative elections. Moreover, those parties formed a coalition to oppose the
president’s party in a united front in the local elections of 2009, which rep-
resented a test of the real power of the opposition before the presidential
elections of 2012.
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4. Evidence on the extent to which voters are nonpartisan comes from
voter reasoning surveys (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013) and from actual
election data at the polling-station level from Benin, Liberia, and Senegal
(Gottlieb and Larreguy 2016).
5. While this does not ﬁt individualized forms of clientelistic exchange
(e.g., Stokes 2005), it is related to Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2007) idea of
“collective clientelism” in which parties target collective transfers to groups
in exchange for electoral support. See also the work of Gingerich and Me-
dina (2013) and Rueda (2016) in Brazil and Colombia, respectively.
000 / A Signaling Theory of Distributive Policy Choice Jessica Gottlieb et al.(Boone 2003b). On the other hand, the incumbent is signif-
icantly more likely to grant new administrative units to an
ethnolinguistic group with strong brokers but a weaker his-
tory of ties to the incumbent party: the Toucouleur (Beck
2008). Second, we demonstrate that administrative unit cre-
ation is an effective targeting strategy, driving a large increase
in the electoral support for the PDS in villages receiving a
new CR.
This paper makes several important contributions to the
nascent yet growing literature on administrative unit splits
in the developing world. Most importantly, we embed ad-
ministrative splits within a larger political economy frame-
work of distributive politics. Past studies have all advanced
theoretical explanations of administrative unit splits that treat
the policy in isolation from other policy instruments. This is
problematic not simply because targeting policies are likely
substitutes but also because previous accounts cannot ex-
plain why incumbents adopt a very costly distributive policy
to begin with. Our paper contributes to the administrative unit
splits literature by proposing a more general theory of pol-
icy choice. Speciﬁcally, we offer a novel argument that links
administrative unit creation with the credibility of an incum-
bent’s long-term commitment to local public service delivery.
We further demonstrate the external validity of our theory in
the last section of the paper, where we show that sub-Saharan
African incumbent governments are more likely to engage
in administrative unit creation when they face genuine elec-
toral opposition, consistent with the logic of our theory.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the effect
of growing electoral pressure in sub-Saharan Africa on the
types of policies that incumbents adopt; such policies are
generally visible, salient, popular, and easy to implement and
can relatively easily be attributed to the incumbent (Harding
and Stasavage 2014). Finally, it contributes to a body of work
on the long-term effect of the administrative structures that
were put in place by the colonizers of Africa (Englebert 2000).
THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
In this section, we develop our theoretical argument, which
relies on the logic of a formal model presented in appen-
dix C. We start by laying out several core assumptions about
the nature of political competition and distributive politics
in many low-income countries. We embed our discussion in
the context of African politics, though we contend that our
argument is relevant to other regions with poor information
access and nonprogrammatic politics, where politicians ex-
hibit congruence through targeted transfers and the avail-
ability of brokers that help coordinate groups of voters.
Though falling short of expectations, there is ample evi-
dence that the introduction of multiparty elections in the earlyThis content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms 1990s across Africa, and elsewhere, has incentivized national
incumbents to adopt policies with a relatively wide appeal
(Harding and Stasavage 2014). Political competition in many
countries, however, exists alongside parties that are weakly
institutionalized and, for the most part, nonprogrammatic
(Riedl 2014). Importantly, contrary to some simplistic depic-
tions of elections in Africa as “ethnic censuses,” a large share
of voters are “uncommitted,” or nonpartisan.4 Furthermore,
there are good reasons to reject the idea that voters care only,
or even mostly, about petty clientelistic transfers (Casey, Glen-
nerster, and Bidwell 2018). Instead, we assume that the ma-
jority of voters look for signals of incumbent congruence, as
deﬁned above. Given the nonprogrammatic nature of poli-
tics, this is manifested in the commitment of incumbents to
making targeted transfers to particular groups of voters, such
as local public services (Carlson 2015).5
Elections in Africa, however, take place in a low-information
environment. This has important implications for the strat-
egies of both voters and politicians. Voters have an incentive
to follow cues from local opinion leaders (or brokers) when
politicians reward bloc-voting villages—particularly when bro-
kers have superior information regarding candidates’ “types”
(Baldwin 2013) and a high capacity to coordinate voters around
a single candidate (de Kadt and Larreguy 2018). Candidates
therefore face strong incentives to signal to brokers that they
will take the interests of their communities to heart once in
ofﬁce. Since, in the absence of a history of a reciprocal rela-
tionship, preelection promises are often not credible, candi-
dates may need to send stronger signals of congruence to vot-
ers than preelection investments in local public goods. In this
context, incumbents hold an advantage over challengers as
they can use government resources to fund distributive pol-
icies that signal congruence to brokers and voters (Collier and
Vicente 2012). A core assumption of this study’s theoretical
argument is that different distributive policies emit signals
of different strengths and that incumbents choose policies
strategically, depending on the strength of the signal required
to lure voters. In the appendix, we explicitly model the scope
conditions under which incumbents seeking to convince par-
ticular groups adopt policies that send a more credible signal
of future public goods provision..067.094 on February 14, 2019 05:43:54 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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We consider a typology of voter-party linkages that vary with
the extent to which parties are inherently unbiased, biased
toward, or biased against a particular group.6 If parties are
biased toward (against) a group, they get (dis)utility from tar-
geting them; otherwise they are impartial. Parties can promise
to provide costly public goods to voters if elected and incur
a reputational cost if they renege. Given that they are costly,
parties renege on promises of targeted goods only when they
gain no inherent utility from targeting those voters. However,
for groups they are biased toward, the utility they receive from
targeting reverses this calculation, and parties will not re-
nege. Incumbents are deﬁned as unconditionally congruent
with respect to those groups.
Voters initially face uncertainty about parties’ types. A
history of previous targeting of public goods toward a partic-
ular group reveals to this group that the incumbent is likely
biased toward them, making promises of future transfers largely
credible. However, voters who have not been previously tar-
geted are unsure about whether the incumbent, and more
generally opposition parties, are impartial or biased against
them.
In a context of increased electoral contestation, an in-
cumbent is likely to need to win over the support of groups
of voters to whom it is impartial but had previously not tar-
geted with local public goods at times of lower levels of con-
testation. The incumbent, we argue, has incentives to signal
to those groups that it is strategically congruent. Small pre-
election investments in local public goods and promises of
a sustained increase in spending on those goods are insuf-
ﬁcient to credibly signal congruence because the temptation
to renege on those promises is high for both incumbents that
are impartial or biased against the group. By contrast, we model
the targeting of a new administrative unit to a group as a costly
reduction to the cost of future local public goods provision to
that group, which only impartial incumbents are willing to in-
cur.7 As a result, incumbents with incentives to be strategi-
cally congruent can target administrative units to groups to
whom they are impartial, thereby credibly signaling their con-
gruence to them.6. This bias could come from sharing ethnicity or kinship, or a similar
regional background, as well as idiosyncratic reasons for which empathy
or antipathy might develop between groups.
7. As demonstrated in the model, the incumbent will never target a
group it is biased against with an administrative unit because the cost of
creating a new administrative unit together with the later reputational cost
of not fulﬁlling a promise to provide a local public good to the group are
sufﬁciently large. This follows since an incumbent with an inherent bias
against a group will always be noncongruent and renege on a promise even
after a new administrative unit is created.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Importantly, the creation of new administrative units is
a tool that only incumbents (but not opposition parties) can
use to signal future congruence to a group. Opposition par-
ties are thus constrained in their ability to credibly signal
congruence to voters with whom they do not already have a
reciprocal relationship. As such, voters might prefer to vote
for the incumbent who has revealed herself to be strategically
congruent (i.e., of an impartial type) rather than to take the
risk of voting for an opposition party that is of uncertain type.
Given that the incumbent party only needs to mobilize
a strict majority of votes to win, it will discriminate between
groups that it targets with either renewed promises of contin-
ued spending in local public goods or administrative units. We
posit that incumbents will naturally choose to target groups
that are more electorally responsive. As we discussed above,
a driving force of electoral responsiveness in the contexts we
study is strong brokers that can coordinate votes in response
to being targeted (Gottlieb and Larreguy 2016).8
This discussion generates the following testable hypotheses:
H1a. Strong-brokers targeting: Incumbents dispropor-
tionally target groups with strong brokers (i.e., those
with relativelyhighcoordinating capacity), compared to
groups with weak brokers.
H1b. Strong-broker group with history of recipro-
cal exchangewith the incumbent:Among strong broker
groups, incumbents disproportionally target local public
goods to those groups that they have targeted in the past.
Members of such groups assume that the incumbent
will continue to be electorally responsive, since preelec-
toral promises of future targeting are credible.
H1c. Strong-broker group with little or no history of
reciprocal exchange with the incumbent:Among strong
broker groups, incumbents disproportionally target ad-
ministrative unit splits to groups that they have not pre-
viously targeted with local public goods. Incumbents
cannot make credible preelectoral promises to mem-
bers of such groups of a sustained increase in spending
on those goods.Voters’ preference for administrative unit splits
Above we argue that granting a group a new administrative
unit allows the incumbent to send a credible signal of post-8. Notably, even in high information environments, voters have a hard
time interpreting signals from the level of service provision in their locality
(Clinton and Grissom 2015). Local opinion leaders thus play an important
mediating function, in both high- and low-information environments.
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on our assumption that an investment in an administrative
unit is a reduction in the overall cost of future public goods
provision to those groups.9 Building on the existing literature
on administrative unit proliferation, and on knowledge gath-
ered during qualitative ﬁeldwork that we conducted in Sen-
egal and from the local press,10 we brieﬂy discuss some evi-
dence of this, as well as the consequent preference by voters
for being granted their own administrative unit (via splits).
First, in developing countries, which typically have low-
capacity local governments, administrative unit splits unam-
biguously increase the administrative attention received by
groups located in new units. Administrative attention captures
the limited ability of local governments to service a large num-
ber of residents (especially given the in-person nature of the
interaction between citizens and public ofﬁcials) as well as
the difﬁculty in servicing far-ﬂung villages (e.g., monitoring,
training, and stocking front-line public service points). Splits
increase administrative attention by reducing the number of
residents and villages that need to be serviced and the average
distance between a local government’s headquarters and the
areas it serves. In other words, administrative unit splits limit
how far a local civil service has to stretch its limited resources
and bureaucratic reach to outlying (peripheral) villages.
Second, voters’ preference for carving out their own ad-
ministrative unit has generally increased following decentral-
ization reforms, since the transfer of responsibilities and re-
sources to subnational tiers of government makes the control
of such units ever more consequential (Grossman and Lewis
2014). Especially where local governments are ﬁnanced almost
exclusively by central government transfers, consistent with
our model, being granted a new local government entails a
signiﬁcant increase in ﬁxed ﬁscal transfers to the groups lo-
cated in the new units, especially given the relative sticki-
ness of administrative boundaries compared to other policy
instruments. In our empirical analysis, we provide evidence
that groups in newly created administrative units in Senegal
effectively experience a large and sustained increase in total
and per capita ﬁnancial transfers from the national govern-
ment after their creation.
If new administrative units indeed represent credible sig-
nals of congruence, voters should electorally reward the in-
cumbents granting those units, whose promises of a sustained9. This reduction can be either monetary or “political,” e.g., allowing
better targeting to groups that are discriminated against as a minority in a
previously large administrative unit.
10. See the appendix for further qualitative evidence in support of our
assumptions and, more generally, our theoretical argument.
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Speciﬁcally, our theory generates the following hypothesis:
H2. New administrative unit: Groups that receive a
new administrative unit (via splits) increase their elec-
toral support for the incumbent in the next election.
While we have so far focused largely on the preferences
of groups of voters, here we discuss the within-group varia-
tion with respect to preferences over administrative unit splits.
Since low-capacity governments can pay more attention to
villages located close to their headquarters, more distant areas
beneﬁt most from such splits. This is because, for these areas,
splits decrease villagers’ traveling distance to the local govern-
ment headquarters (Grossman and Lewis 2014) and help the
local economy (Hassan 2016). Indeed, for both political and
practical reasons (most power brokers and public services are
located in or near the local government’s headquarters), the
value of a new administrative unit increases the further one
resides from the old local government’s headquarters.
Naturally, residents in “rump” areas (i.e., the part of an
original administrative unit that remains after a new one is
created), will have, on average, lower utility for a split than the
residents of a new administrative unit. Leaders in rump areas
may oppose splits because they lose control over a large share
of the territory of their constituency and may be subject to
earlier reelection. Additionally, our theory suggests that de-
creasing costs to future public goods provision for one group
via a new administrative unit might consequently reduce the
likelihood that other groups are targeted with local public
goods. We argue, however, that the preference for splits in
rump areas is strongest where the expected beneﬁts from in-
creased attention are largest—that is, villages located furthest
from the old administrative unit’s headquarters. The above
discussion leads to an additional hypothesis:
H3. Groups in rump areas and distance to head-
quarters: Voters from groups in rump administrative
units perceive fewer beneﬁts from splits compared to
those receiving a new local government and thus vote
for the incumbent at lower rates. Among the former
groups, electoral reward to the incumbent post-split in-
creases with distance to the local government’s head-
quarters.
In addition to signaling congruence to voters, adminis-
trative unit splits could also increase the surveillance of (and
ability to mobilize) the electorate. In both cases, we would ex-
pect splits to increase the incumbent’s vote share more than
would be expected in response to immediate transfers of goods..067.094 on February 14, 2019 05:43:54 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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between these alternative explanations.Scope conditions
Our theory suggests that incumbents will only use the costly
tool of an administrative unit split to signal congruence when
they face electoral incentives to do so. We thus expect to ob-
serve more administrative unit creations following an in-
crease in electoral competition. Another implication of the
model is that greater uncertainty about whether opposition
parties will be noncongruent with respect to speciﬁc groups
will cause voters from groups targeted by a new adminis-
trative unit to support the incumbent they have learned is
strategically congruent and whose promises of local public
goods are credible. In polities with high ethnic fractional-
ization, we expect greater uncertainty over the alignment be-
tween parties and voters. As such, we expect that compe-
tition should be especially likely to generate administrative
unit proliferation in places with higher levels of ethnic frac-
tionalization.12. Most of the literature has viewed these reforms as furthering the
interests of the “PS state” because they strengthened local patronage networks.
Boone (2003a), for example, argues that Senegal’s decentralization was part of
an institution-building strategy of power sharing that allowed both the central
government and local elites to extract more rents. Nevertheless, others (e.g.,
Dahou and Foucher 2009) have argued that decentralization triggered a de
facto dispersal of resources that made it easier for opposition parties to
emerge—including Wade’s PDS, which in many areas was able to success-
fully capture the PS clientèle. A more recent reform (2014) suppressed re-
gional councils, transferred more powers to the départements, and harmo-POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
In this section we provide the necessary background on po-
litical and administrative decentralization in Senegal to con-
textualize the distributive policy choice faced by the incum-
bent and apply our theory of differential targeting by group
type to distinct ethnoreligious groups in Senegal. Senegal offers
an ideal context in which to study incumbents’ strategic use
of different distributive policies and the effects of administra-
tive unit creation on electoral outcomes. First, social and re-
ligious groups in Senegal have brokers with varying degrees
of voter coordination capacity (Gottlieb 2017). Second, po-
litical competition in Senegal is increasingly high.11 Third,
Senegal recently witnessed a series of widespread administrative-
unit splits: about 20% of villages were affected by splits in
2008 alone; a preelection year. Fourth, the president of Sen-
egal has almost total control over splits, which allows us to
better focus on targeting as opposed to analyzing splits that
reﬂect voters’ choice. Fifth, Senegal makes available ﬁne-grained
data at a very disaggregated level—village or polling station—
over time, which allows us to improve on identiﬁcation strat-
egies used in previous studies, as explained below.11. While Senegal legalized multiparty competition in 1990, electoral
competition was hampered by the ruling party’s control over the electoral
process. In 2000, the ﬁrst democratic transfer of power (from the PS to
Wade’s PDS) took place.
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Historical and legal aspects
With the exception of a few major cities, Senegal did not have
formal local governments until 1972 and did not elect local
representatives with executive power until 1990. Since the 1990s,
however, the pace of decentralization has increased dramat-
ically. A 1992 law established regions as a new tier of gov-
ernment, and a 1996 reform transferred executive powers to
regions and to three lower local government tiers: towns (com-
munes), municipalities within the country’s ﬁve largest cities
(communes d’arrondissement), and CRs.12
The 1996 law provided the regulatory framework for
administrative unit splits during the period covered in this
study. Though the creation of new CRs was subject to the ad-
visory opinion of regional councils, it ultimately entered into
force only through a government decree signed by the pres-
ident or prime minister who were not liable to provide jus-
tiﬁcations for splits.13 And, while the law also stated that prior
to changes in administrative boundaries, the opinion of “all
interested rural councils, municipal councils, and regional coun-
cils [was] required,” it was not explicitly binding. In 2010, the
minister in charge of decentralization stated that “the gov-
ernment can reserve the right to create a commune, a rural
community, a region or a département wherever it deems nec-
essary” (Le Soleil, October 2010).14
Social setting
Existing narrative accounts describe two culturally distinct
groups in Senegal—the Mouride religious brotherhood and the
ethnic Toucouleur—as having notably inﬂuential local lead-
ers that serve as vote brokers (Beck 2008; Boone 2003b). Got-
tlieb (2017) shows empirically that villages with higher con-nized the status of towns and CRs to create a single commune status.
13. Article 193 du Code des Collectivités Locales de 1996.
14. Following a split via government decree, rural councils were legally
dissolved and the CR would be administered by a “special delegation” until
local elections could be organized. The automatic removal of local elected
ofﬁcials regularly triggered conﬂicts. For example, the military had to be
deployed to install the “special delegation” in Chérif Lo, and in Mbane
councilors went on a hunger strike to express their opposition to a split
(Sud Quotidien, May 24, 2011).
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lages to coordinate votes. While both groups have relatively
strong brokers with high vote-coordinating capacity, they
are distinct in their prior history of a reciprocal relationship
with Wade’s PDS. As we explain below, the Mouride re-
semble a strong broker group with a history of a reciprocal
relationship with the incumbent; the Toucouleur resemble a
strong broker group without such a history.
There are two dimensions along which these groups
differ—shared identity and economic autonomy—that help
explain the differential history of reciprocity with the incum-
bent party in Senegal and can serve as potential predictors to
consider when generalizing to other cases. First, coethnicity
and coreligiosity are frequently cited as drivers of a reciprocal
relationship with politicians either because shared identity
serves as a heuristic for candidate quality in information-poor
contexts (Conroy-Krutz 2013) or because it triggers expecta-
tions of favoritism (Chandra 2004). Second, economic au-
tonomy can support a reciprocal political relationship, though
this is somewhat less intuitive. For electoral reciprocity to
precede an incumbent’s rise to power or continue after he
loses an election, voters and their brokers must be willing to
be in the opposition, at least temporarily. While not explicitly
modeled in our theory, we argue that economic autonomy—
that is, less reliance on the government for economic well-
being—can make a group take a long view and support op-
position candidates or parties and thus sustain reciprocal
relationships outside an incumbent’s reign.
The Mouride—the second largest Suﬁ brotherhood in
Senegal—are generally considered the most loyal partisans
of Wade.15 This is, in part, due to Wade’s membership in the
Muslim brotherhood and to the public attention he lavished
on the brotherhood’s inﬂuential leadership (Resnick 2013).
In addition, the Mouride’s strong political brokers have tra-
ditionally been the most economically autonomous from the
state (Beck 2008; Boone 2003b).16 The Mouride thus have
greater capacity than other groups to support an opposition
candidate, which they did in the 1993 elections when many
of their religious leaders supported Wade’s PDS (Beck 2008).
Further, after the fall of the PDS from presidential power in
2012, the 2014 local elections saw continued support for the
PDS in both the Mouride holy city of Touba and the prov-15. The Toucouleur belong almost entirely to the largest brotherhood,
known as Tidjane, making these categories nearly mutually exclusive.
16. O’Brien (1975) attributes the strength of Mouride leaders to their
status as the dominant local authority structure following the collapse of
the precolonial state. During and after colonization, Mouride religious leaders
or marabouts were the main intermediaries between the peasants of Senegal’s
populous groundnut basin and the state.
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that is home to these two places is the only one of 14 where
Macky Sall’s 2016 referendum was voted down; as PDS lead-
ers encouraged this “no” vote as a plebiscite on Sall’s pres-
idency, the Mouride were again squarely in the opposition
(Kelly 2016).
Turning to the Toucouleur, both Boone (2003b) and Beck
(2008) explain broker strength, and thus vote coordinating
capacity, among the Toucouleur as deriving from a hierarchical
social structure enshrined in a caste system. In contrast to the
Mouride, Beck (2008) identiﬁes these brokers as “dependent”
upon the incumbent regime because they have access to fewer
resources. The Toucouleur thus have less autonomy to form
loyalties to any particular political party and must instead
negotiate opportunistically for credible promises of transfers,
generally from a strategically congruent incumbent. Their un-
willingness to join the opposition is evidenced by the rela-
tively high level of electoral support in 2000 for the outgoing
incumbent party (PS) in the most densely Toucouleur prov-
ince, Matam (71%), compared to the relatively high level of
support for the opposition (PDS) in the most densely Mou-
ride province, Mbacké (63%).EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
We turn to describe our empirical strategy for three anal-
yses: (a) the effect of CR splits on central government trans-
fers, (b) the relationship between distributive policy targeting
and group identity, and (c) the effect of CR splits on the in-
cumbent’s vote share.New CR creation effects on central
government transfers
We begin by testing whether, consistent with the model’s
implications and voters’ expectations described above, admin-
istrative unit splits entail an increase in future ﬁnancial ﬂows
for affected communities. To that end, we focus on CRs as
the unit of analysis and use, as a dependent variable, data on
transfers from the central government to CRs for the pe-
riod 2007–14, which we obtained from the Division for Lo-
cal Governments (Direction des Collectivités Locales), of the
Senegalese Ministry of the Interior. Our main measure of
transfers aggregates two types of ﬁnancial ﬂows: (1) current
expenditures and (2) long-term investment projects.17 Using
these data, we run the following ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation:
Transfersijt p a1 bSplitjt 1 hj 1 dt 1 εijt; ð1Þ17. Further details on this data set are provided in app. A.
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the grouping we use for this analysis.
Volume 81 Number 2 April 2019 / 000where Transfersijt denotes per capita transfers received by CR i
contained in old CR j, in year t (measured in levels and in
logs), Splitjt is a dummy for split CR (at the level of old CR j),
hj are old CR j ﬁxed effects, and dt are year ﬁxed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the old CR j. We
cannot include CR ﬁxed effects hi in this speciﬁcation since
transfers are not observed at the level of rump and new CRs
prior to splits.
We are further interested in testing whether transfers vary
between rump and new units after a CR split. We use New
to indicate a new CR in 2008, and Rump to denote a post-
split CR under the old CR headquarters in 2008. We then
estimate the following regression:
Transfersijt p a1 b1SplitjtRumpijt 1 b2SplitjtNewijt
1 hj 1 dt 1 εijt:
ð2Þ
Targeting: Different strategies for different groups?
In our second analysis we test the study’s main targeting hy-
potheses: that incumbents are less likely to target groups with
weak brokers (hypothesis 1a) and that the history of recip-
rocal exchange conditions the targeting policies—local pub-
lic goods or new administrative units—that incumbents adopt
toward groups with strong brokers (hypotheses 1b and 1c).
Early pioneering work on the determinants of adminis-
trative unit splits (e.g., Green 2010) erroneously used the unit
that split as the unit of analysis.18 Later work conducted its
analysis at one level below the unit that splits (e.g., Grossman
and Lewis 2014; Hassan 2016). While an improvement, this
approach also suffers from problems since the boundaries of
the cluster of villages that form new units are potentially en-
dogenous. By using a unit that is stable over time—villages—
we are able to control for selection into splitting status, as well
as differential trends between splitting and stable units.
Our main dependent variables are (1) assignment to a
new CR and (2) change in local and national public goods.
For the ﬁrst dependent variable, our analysis is restricted to
the creation of 74 new CRs (from a baseline of 314, a 24%
increase) that took place in 2008, which represents the stark-
est and (empirically cleanest) episode of administrative-unit
creation in Senegal’s recent history, directly affecting 1,627
of a total of 10,763 villages (table A.5).19 Turning to the sec-
ond set of dependent variables, we use DLocal Goods to mea-
sure changes in the provision of ﬁve locally administered pub-18. See critique in Grossman and Lewis (2014, 200).
19. While a few CRs (16) were also created between 2010 and 2011,
these affected a relatively small number (317) of villages and they might
have also led to increased public goods provision before the 2012 election.
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rural roads, and local markets) between 2000 and 2009. While
local public goods are more excludable—and thus more likely
to be targeted to speciﬁc areas—we also create the variable
DNational Goods using three goods administered at the na-
tional level: telephone networks, electricity, and paved roads.
Public goods data are derived from village surveys conducted
by the Senegalese National Statistics Agency in 2000 and 2009
and contain information about whether each type of public
good is provided in each village. Using these data summa-
rized in table A.7, we create a local public goods index and a
national public goods index for each year, which sum the bi-
nary access indicators for each set of public goods.
To test our differential targeting hypotheses, we group vil-
lages into three categories: Mouride, Toucouleur, and Other.20
We classify a village as Toucouleur or Mouride if over 50%
of a village’s population share is reported to belong to that
group according to the 2002 Senegalese census.21
We then estimate how an incumbent’s distributive pol-
icy choices—the creation of a new CR, and the provision of
national and local public goods—correlate with the social com-
position of villages. Formally, we run the following speciﬁ-
cation:
Policyvct p a1 b1Mouridevc 1 b2Toucouleurvc 1 εvct; ð3Þ
where Policyvct indicates whether a speciﬁc policy was im-
plemented in village v located in old CR c, Mouridevc and
Toucouleurvc, respectively, indicate whether more than half
of the village’s population self-identiﬁed as Mouride and Tou-
couleur. The terms b1 and b2 are the two coefﬁcients of in-
terest; we cluster standard errors at the CR level. Building on
the theoretical framework presented above, b1 is expected
to be positive when examining change in public goods pro-
vision, since the Mouride have both a high coordinating
capacity and a long history of reciprocal exchange with the
incumbent. The term b2 is expected to be positive when ex-
amining new CR creation, since the Toucouleur have a high21. We combine the Toucouleur with the Peul and Pulaar groups, as
these self-reported census categories commonly overlap. Table A.16 shows
robustness to considering only Toucouleur and Peul or only Toucouleur
and Pulaar groups. Table A.17 indicates that our results are also robust to
using different population share cutoff points (e.g., 60%, 70%, or 80%,
rather than 50%).
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22. The omitted category in this speciﬁcation is villages in non-split
CRs, located at zero distance from the CR headquarters, in the pre-split
period. Equation (4) deliberately omits terms that are collinear with the
other ﬁxed effects: in particular, Rumpvc is not included in levels since it is
jointly collinear with Newvc and hc. Similarly, RumpvcPostt is jointly col-
linear with hcPostt and NewvcPostt; Rumpvchc, and Newvchc are collinear
with the main effects Rumpvc, Newvc, and hc; NewvchcPostt, and
RumpvchcPostt are collinear with NewvcPostt, and RumpvcPostt.
23. Removing g1Xvc from the baseline speciﬁcation effectively
removes g1XvcPostt. Robustness to this alternative speciﬁcation suggests
that results are unlikely to be driven by differential trends across villages
that vary in Distvc, which could be correlated with Xvc.
000 / A Signaling Theory of Distributive Policy Choice Jessica Gottlieb et al.coordinating capacity but no history of reciprocal exchange
with the incumbent.
Electoral returns to the creation of new CRs
Finally, we estimate the electoral consequences of CR cre-
ation. Speciﬁcally, we test whether areas that receive a new
CR increase their electoral support for the incumbent in the
next election (hypothesis 2), relative to all other areas. We
also test whether within rump areas, those residing further
from the CR headquarters should show a relatively larger
support for the incumbent after being carved out (hypoth-
esis 3).
Our dependent variable, DIncumbent, measures the
Change in the vote share of Wade’s PDS, from the pre- to
the post-split period. Electoral outcomes are measured at the
polling station level and computed using data from Senegal’s
Independent National Electoral Commission. Incumbent is
deﬁned as PDS vote share.
Past studies have argued that splits are designed to in-
crease government presence at the grassroots level and thereby
increase the surveillance required to mobilize the electorate.
Thus, we also construct a measure, Turnout, deﬁned as the
number of valid votes divided by the total number of reg-
istered voters. We use the change in this outcome variable
to adjudicate between our hypotheses and this alternative ex-
planation. Summary of these election outcomes can be found
in the table A.6.
Our key independent variables—New and Rump, deﬁned
above—capture changes in a village’s CR status over time,
focusing on CR splits that took place in 2008. Given that we
are interested in the change in Wade’s PDS vote before and
after 2008, we also deﬁne a period indicator Post, which
captures the elections after 2008. In our baseline speciﬁca-
tion, we restrict to the two major elections that took place
in a relatively short time span (2007 and 2009) around the
2008 splits. This reduced time frame limits the possibility
that other confounding policies— for example, major public
goods—took place at the village level between the creation of
new CRs and the subsequent election. We also test robust-
ness to comparing pre- and post-split elections for CR coun-
cilors (D from 2002 to 2009).
In order to test hypothesis 3, we further create a con-
tinuous measure of Distance to CR headquarters prior to
2008, using village geographical coordinates published by the
Senegal National Statistics Agency. We do not include mea-
sures of distance from a new CR headquarters in our estima-
tion, since they are posttreatment.
We are interested in the causal effect of administrative
unit creation, which is an endogenous distributive policy. To
test this main implication of our theory while controlling forThis content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms selection into administrative splits, we estimate the following
difference-in-differences model:
yvct p a0 1 a1Distvc 1 a2NewvcDistvc 1 a3RumpvcDistvc
1 a4Newvc 1 hc 1 Postt
1 b1DistvcPostt 1 b2NewvcDistvcPostt
1 b3RumpvcDistvcPostt 1 b4NewvcPostt
1 hcPostt 1 g0Xvc 1 g1XvcPostt 1 εvct;
ð4Þ
where yvct is the dependent variable in village v, old CR c,
and year t; Distvc is the village’s distance to the old CR
headquarters; hc is an indicator for the CR that the village v
belonged to prior to 2008; Newvc is an indicator for new-
CR villages; Rumpvc is an indicator for rump-CR villages;
Postt is an indicator for the post-2008 period; hc is a ﬁxed
effect for the old CR; and Xvc is a ﬂexible vector of controls,
described above.22 Note that for computational efﬁciency we
run, and present estimates from equation (4) in ﬁrst differ-
ences. As a robustness check we also estimate this equation
without the controls g1Xvc.23
Control variables Xvc are constructed using Senegal’s 2002
census data and include village population over the age of
20 (i.e., eligible voters in the 2000 elections), the population
share of each major ethnicity and religious group, and house-
hold assets. Controls are ﬁrst log-transformed and then en-
tered as linear, quadratic, and cubic variables. These variables
are summarized in tables A.8 and A.9.
Our main coefﬁcients of interest are b2, b3, and b4. The
terms b2 and b3, capture heterogeneity in the effect of splits
for New-CR and Rump-CR villages, respectively. Speciﬁcally,
b3 1 0 implies that the magnitude of the positive effect of
splits for villages in Rump CRs increases with distance from
the old CR headquarters, and b4, which captures the changes
in outcomes in new-CR villages compared to rump-CR
villages, provides a direct test of hypothesis 3.
Equation (4) controls for selection into CR splits and for
differential trends between split and stable CRs through the
hc and hcPostt terms, respectively. The other main effects.067.094 on February 14, 2019 05:43:54 AM
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with distance from the old CR headquarters (in levels and
over time), and differences associated with being inside a
rump or a new CR (in levels and over time). Our main iden-
tiﬁcation assumption is that, conditional on these controls,
there are no differential trends in electoral outcomes within
villages in split units, or across different distances from the
old CR headquarters. We test this no differential trends as-
sumption using electoral data prior to 2008, as described in
the next section.
Electoral returns of the creation
of public-goods targeting
We do not estimate the electoral return of public-goods
targeting for two reasons. First, contrary to the case of new
CRs, local public-goods transfers are often distributed to
groups that are bound in a reciprocal relationship with a
particular party. Thus, transfers beget votes and votes beget
transfers. Not only is it difﬁcult to parse out whether goods
are being targeted as a reward for past votes or a motivation
for future votes, but we should also expect that increases in
public goods transfers to reciprocal groups may result in
no over-time increases in electoral support for the incum-
bent because those groups are already voting for the incum-
bent at high rates.
Second, the strategy we use to identify the effects of CR
creation on incumbent’s vote share cannot be used for local
public goods provision. This is because the unit at which the
policy is implemented (village) is the same unit of analysis
for which we have only two periods of data, and conse-
quently, we are unable to account for unit-speciﬁc trends while
exploiting within-unit variation in targeted policies.This content downloaded from 193.054
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In this section, we provide information on the study’s key
ﬁndings.
Government transfers
We ﬁnd that CRs that split experience a large increase in
total and per capita transfers from the national government
after 2008. Figure 2 shows that, while CRs that split in 2008
received slightly fewer per capita transfers in 2007–8 than
those that did not, they received a signiﬁcantly larger amount
in the post-split period. Figure A.1 in the appendix shows
a similar pattern using instead logs of per capita transfers.
Within the CRs that split in 2008, we ﬁnd that while both
Rump and New CRs experienced a jump in transfers right
after the split relative to no-split CRs, only for New CRs is
this increase sustained over time.
These graphical patterns are corroborated by the regres-
sion analysis formalized in equations (1) and (2) and shown
in table A.10. We ﬁnd that splits are associated with higher
per capita transfers from the central government to CRs on
the order of about 2,000 FCFA or around 50% of the base-
line mean. The magnitude of this effect is signiﬁcantly larger
for new CRs relative to rump CRs. While these estimates can-
not be interpreted as causal, they demonstrate that splits are
associated with larger transfers per capita in the long run. This
ﬁnding is consistent with our argument that administrative
unit creation provides strategically congruent incumbents
with a tool to signal postelection congruence.
Targeting
We now turn to testing our argument that incumbents
target different policies to groups differing across the follow-Figure 2. The effect of CR splits on per capita transfers (levels), 2007–14.067.094 on February 14, 2019 05:43:54 AM
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kers and (ii) the history of reciprocal exchange with the in-
cumbent.
Consistent with hypothesis 1b, table 1 shows that pub-
lic goods are more likely targeted to areas dominated by
the Mouride and less likely targeted to areas dominated by
the Toucouleur. More so, consistent with hypothesis 1c, splits
are more likely to occur in areas dominated by the Tou-
couleur (though results fall just below reported signiﬁcance
levels) and signiﬁcantly less likely to occur in areas domi-
nated by the Mouride. These ﬁndings are thus additionally
supportive of hypothesis 1a—that both groups (because of
their high coordinating capacity) should be more likely to be
targeted by at least one kind of policy relative to the omitted
group.24
A potential concern with this analysis of speciﬁc groups
is that the results are being driven by omitted variables cor-
related with group identity but unrelated to our theory. In
particular, the Mouride are often described as running a state24. We do not expect that both groups should be targeted with more
of both policies relative to the omitted category groups because, as our theory
suggests, the incumbent will only use the strategy known to be most efﬁcient
for each of these two groups. In turn, we expect, and observe, a more mixed
strategy among the omitted category groups for whom the likelihood of ex-
hibiting strong brokers and a history of reciprocal exchange with the in-
cumbent party is less clear.
This content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms within a state (Villalón 1995) because the brotherhood lead-
ership has secured autonomous administrative authority and
a special legal status for their holy city of Touba, the second
largest after the capital of Dakar. Perhaps this unique orga-
nizational capacity is driving the higher incidence of public
goods, rather than the reciprocal relationship with the incum-
bent that we claim. We expect this concern to be most sa-
lient among observations in and around Touba. Table A.15
shows robustness of our results to the exclusion of all obser-
vations in the Departement of Mbacké, the administrative dis-
trict containing the city of Touba, which provides conﬁdence
that these ﬁndings are not being driven by the autonomous
organizational capacity peculiar to the Mouride brotherhood.
Elections
What are the effects of CR splits on the change in Wade’s
vote share between 2007 and 2009? The ﬁrst three columns
in table 2 are our baseline speciﬁcations (where distance is
measured ﬁrst in logs and then in levels), which include con-
trols and ﬁxed effects as discussed above. We then show ro-
bustness to removing controls.
Consistent with hypothesis 2, in all speciﬁcations, New-
CR villages are signiﬁcantly more likely to increase their in-
cumbent support. This ﬁnding is consistent with our argu-
ment developed above that voters have a strong preference










(non-Touc/Peul/Pulaar) 2.124*** .228** .298*** 2.049* .203** .163**(.028) (.082) (.066) (.024) (.066) (.049)
Touc/Peul/Pulaar
(non-Mouride) .072 2.603*** 2.371*** .030 2.253*** 2.141***
(.037) (.067) (.056) (.034) (.058) (.042)Local goods (2000) .385***
(.018)National goods (2000) .488***
(.019)Observations 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763
Adjusted R2 .047 .064 .060 .125 .279 .329
Controls No No No Yes Yes YesNote. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the old CR level. Included controls are logged population (ﬂexible), logged assets
(linear, quadratic, cubic), and public goods (2000).
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.u/t-and-c).
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and that our estimates might be driven by comparing changes
in Wade’s vote share between a national (2007) and a local
election (2009), table A.11 shows that the results are robust
to examining changes between the 2002 and 2009 local elec-
tions.
Turning to hypothesis 3, we ﬁnd that Rump-CR villages
located further from the old CR headquarters exhibit in-
creased support for the incumbent, as expected. This effect,
however, is relatively small and signiﬁcant only when we do
not include controls and distance is measured in levels (ta-
ble 2, col. 6).
Testing identiﬁcation assumptions. In table A.2 we test
some of our identiﬁcation assumptions of the difference-
in-difference estimation (eq. [4]). Most importantly, our re-
sults suggest that pre-split trends in incumbent support (be-
tween 2000 and 2007) across places that will split and places
that will not are not signiﬁcantly different. More so, the ﬁnd-
ings in table A.2 suggests that the granting of new CRs is
not a reward for past votes, a result that would be at odds
with our argument that administrative unit splits are designed
to lure voters and brokers from groups with which the in-
cumbent does not have a history of reciprocal exchange.
We have argued that incumbents grant new administra-
tive units to groups that require a rather strong signal of com-This content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms mitment since preelection promises are not credible when
the group does not have a history of reciprocal exchange. To
further probe the assumption that underlies this argument,
we take advantage of the fact that some new CRs were only
granted in 2010–11, following the 2009 election. We then con-
duct a placebo analysis estimating equation (4) but using the
latter splits as the key independent variables. Since these splits
did not occur yet, we expect the effect of future splits to be
insigniﬁcant. This expectation is borne out in our data, as re-
ported in table A.3.
Alternative explanations. We turn to eliminate alternative
explanations. First, rather than signaling greater congruence,
the increased presence of the state might allow the ruling party
to increase voter mobilization relative to the (possibly already
high) baseline conditions. In other words, a greater capacity
for electoral mobilization—rather than changes in citizen up-
dating—could be causing the increase in incumbent vote share
in 2009. We test this alternative indirectly by examining the
effect of administrative splits on voter turnout. A null effect
of CR splits on turnout would suggest that the mobilization
channel is not a serious concern.
As shown in table A.4, we ﬁnd no discernible effect of
CR creation on turnout. Villages in newly created CRs do not
exhibit higher turnout—the coefﬁcient for this variable is a













(6)New CR (by 2009) p 1 .104* .127 .123* .096* .152 .129*
(.046) (.074) (.054) (.048) (.080) (.057)Distance .006 .000 .002 2.001
(.006) (.001) (.007) (.001)New CR (by 2009) p 1 # distance .006 .001 2.001 .001
(.021) (.001) (.025) (.002)Rump CR (by 2009) p 1 # distance .022 .004 .028 .005*
(.015) (.002) (.016) (.002)Incumbent (2007) 2.677*** 2.678*** 2.678***
(.026) (.026) (.026)Observations 4,136 4,136 4,136 4,136 4,136 4,136
Adjusted R2 .601 .601 .602 .425 .425 .426
Controls Yes Yes Yes No No NoNote. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the old CR level. Included controls are logged population (ﬂexible), logged ethnic and religious
group size (linear, quadratic, cubic), incumbent vote share in 2007, and logged assets (linear, quadratic, cubic). Fixed effects are entered at the old CR level.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
25. We build and expand a data set assembled by Grossman et al.
(2017).
26. Democracy corresponds to e_democ, Polyrachy to v2x_polyarchy.
Margin of Victory was calculated by the authors using the variables v2ellovtlg
and v2ellovtsm such that higher values entail greater competition.
000 / A Signaling Theory of Distributive Policy Choice Jessica Gottlieb et al.interaction of New-CR and Rump-CR villages with distance
from the old CR headquarters. These results suggest that this
channel is unlikely to be a key mechanism.
A second concern is that CR splits improved the ability of
brokers to monitor voters by creating more homogeneous
voting blocs, along religious or ethnic dimensions. To address
this concern, we rerun our baseline speciﬁcation interacting
New-CR and Rump-CR status with the ethnic and religious
distance between each village and the average of its old CR.
Table A.13 shows that our results are unlikely to be explained
by possible homogenization of the new CR boundaries. First,
the average effect of being a New-CR is robust to the inclu-
sion of main effects for ethnic and religious fractionalization.
Second, the interactions of New-CR and Rump-CR indica-
tors with fractionalization yield mostly insigniﬁcant coefﬁci-
ents, and the only two signiﬁcant coefﬁcients have the op-
posite sign one would expect if homogenization were the
driver of the increase in incumbent vote shares in new CRs.
This is consistent with the fact that, as table A.12 indicates,
CR splits did not create administrative units that were sub-
stantially more homogeneous. Third, the results in table A.13
also indicate that greater homogeneity in policy preferences
in split CRs is unlikely to explain our main ﬁndings.
A ﬁnal concern is that CR splits followed demands of
voters in areas that suffered political, economic, and sym-
bolic marginalization, which potentially exhibited increasing
support for the incumbent. To deal with this concern, we
test whether the creation of new CRs is predicted by baseline
levels of local and national public goods, the ethnic and reli-
gious distance between each village and the average of its CR,
and an asset index and population, as well as the interactions
of all these variables and the distance from the old CR head-
quarters. The largely null ﬁndings in table A.14 indicate that
our results are unlikely to be accounted for or explained by
any of the mentioned marginalization categories. Overall, the
estimates are not consistent with the alternative explanations
discussed herein.
EXTERNAL VALIDITY
As in any case study, there may be features unique to the
case that shape distributive policies. While replicating the
above analysis for all African countries is unfeasible, we ad-
dress external validity concerns by testing—using cross na-
tional longitudinal data—two of our theory’s core implica-
tions. First, we explore whether across sub-Saharan Africa
an increase in the number of primary administrative units
follows heightened political competition and, second, whether
the association between political contestation and adminis-
trative unit proliferation is larger in ethnically diverse coun-
tries, as we explained above.This content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Our dependent variable is a count measure of the num-
ber of primary administrative units for all African countries
between 1990 and 2015.25 Our key input variable is political
contestation, which we proxy with the widely used polity2
score, which ranges from 210 to 10. As we show below in
table 3, our results are robust to instead using three alterna-
tive proxy measures of contestation, derived from the Variety
of Democracies (VDEM) data set: (a) Democracy, a 10-point
scale measuring whether a polity is an institutionalized de-
mocracy; (b) Polyarchy, a continuous measure between 0
and 1, measuring “to what extent is the ideal of electoral de-
mocracy in its fullest sense achieved”; and (c) Margin of Vic-
tory, measured as 2jWt 2 Ctj, capturing the difference in
vote share of the incumbent president (Wt) and his main chal-
lenger (Ct) in the last national elections.26
We test the relationship between contestation and admin-
istrative unit proliferation using country ﬁxed effects regres-
sions that account for all time-invariant national-level character-
istics, clustering standard errors at the country level. Since the
four proxy measures of contestation are on different scales,
we normalize those variables to allow better comparability of
the results. As table 3 makes clear (odd columns), increase in
levels of contestation is associated with increase in the num-
ber of administrative units, irrespective of the measure used.
We further run similar country ﬁxed-effects models subset-
ting the data to include only preelection years; consistent with
our theoretical framework, results in this case are even stronger
(table A.18).
A core assumption of our theory is that (some) voters are
uncertain about the incumbent’s type, that is, his congruence
with one’s group. Since ethnicity is often used as a heuristic
to signal congruence, at least in the African context (Carlson
2015), voters uncertain of politician type should be increas-
ing in ethnolinguistic fractionalization. One corollary of this
is that the relationship between contestation and the num-
ber of administrative units should be stronger in more di-
verse countries. Using Nunn’s (2008) continuous measure
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) as a moderator (ta-
ble 3, even columns), we ﬁnd robust evidence conﬁrming this
corollary (see also ﬁg. 3).
CONCLUSION
This paper advances a novel explanation for the rapid in-
crease in the number of administrative splits across the
developing world since the 1990s. Our theoretical argument.067.094 on February 14, 2019 05:43:54 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 81 Number 2 April 2019 / 000is rooted in the context of new democracies (and electoral
authoritarian regimes), in which incumbents are not free
from the need to deliver to voters in order to win increas-
ingly competitive elections. Such countries are characterized
by weak information environments and generally nonpro-This content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms grammatic parties. In these contexts, voters use heuristics—
such as ascriptive characteristics and elite cues—to infer can-
didates’ congruence with their interest for targeted beneﬁts.
In response, incumbents are increasingly using distributive
policies strategically to signal congruence but face a problemTable 3. Relationship between Contestation and Administrative Unit ProliferationPolity2 Polyarchy.067.094 on Februa
and Conditions (httpDemocracyry 14, 2019 05:43:54 AM
://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-MoV(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)and-c).(8)Polity2 1.780** 22.497
(.826) (1.894)Polity2 # ELF 6.144*
(3.586)Polyarchy 1.347** 21.722
(.556) (1.310)Polyarchy # ELF 4.494*
(2.461)Democracy 1.675** 21.395
(.822) (1.248)Democracy # ELF 4.549
(2.731)Margin of victory (MoV) .645* 2.528
(.370) (1.239)MoV # ELF 1.809
(2.179)N 1,081 1,058 1,137 1,085 980 957 733 709Note. Standard errors clustered at the country level. ELF p ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.Figure 3. Marginal effects of contestation (proxied using Polity2) on the number of administrative units in year t, moderated by a country’s ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (ELF), using a binning estimate proposed by Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2017).
000 / A Signaling Theory of Distributive Policy Choice Jessica Gottlieb et al.that some targeted beneﬁts may not emit a strong enough
signal to lure groups that were not part of the incumbent
party’s “minimum winning coalition” in the (less politically
contested) past.
We argue that incumbents adopt a policy of adminis-
trative unit splits to target such groups, since this policy is a
sufﬁciently strong signal about the congruence of the in-
cumbent’s party to the targeted voters. This is because the
granting of a new administrative unit entails a relatively stable
ﬂow of central government transfers and a reduction in the
cost of future targeting of local public goods. By contrast, in-
cumbents target public goods (and promises of future local
public goods ﬂows) to groups that have strong brokers and
a shared history of reciprocal exchange. We test these argu-
ments using the case of Senegal and ﬁnd robust support for
our theoretical predictions.
Our signaling theory of distributive policy choice con-
tributes to past work in several important ways. First, while,
past studies—for example, Grossman and Lewis (2014), Has-
san (2016), and Pierskalla (2016b)—all assume that electoral
considerations dominate the strategic use of administrative-
unit splits, they do not embed the incumbent’s strategy within
a larger framework of distributive policy choice.
Second, our theory of strategic choice does not presup-
pose that incumbents are necessarily reactive to grassroots
mobilization. Grossman and Lewis (2014) argue that incum-
bents mainly respond to bottom-up pressure and that the
demand for splits is strongest in areas that suffer political,
economic, and symbolic marginalization. Similarly, Pierskalla
(2016b) argues that national governments respond to demand
from areas with higher capacity for collective action. This sort
of reactive strategy may be relevant for countries (such as
Uganda and Indonesia) where splits must be voted on ﬁrst
by the local government, but not in other contexts (such as
Senegal and Kenya) where incumbents have close to full
control over administrative unit splits.
Third, our theoretical argument is not inconsistent with
those arguing that the creation of new administrative units
allows incumbents to strengthen patronage networks and co-
opt local elites (Green 2010). Using administrative unit splits
to target groups that do not have a history of reciprocal ex-
change with the incumbent’s party can certainly help cement
new alliances between the national government and local
elites and brokers (Kimura 2012). Yet a narrow focus on
patronage jobs not only overlooks the beneﬁts for local cit-
izens but also sidesteps the fact that there are more efﬁcient
ways to target groups (that do not entail bloating the bu-
reaucracy). Furthermore, our argument regrading the im-
portance of administrative attention helps explain why voters
in rump areas are unlikely to punish the incumbent for ad-This content downloaded from 193.054
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ministrative unit splits, a point that past theories have had a
hard time explaining.
While we explicitly argue that incumbents are more likely
to target groups that have strong brokers, understanding the
conditions that support brokers’ ability to coordinate votes is
beyond the scope of this paper, offering exciting avenues for
future work. Similarly, we argue that reciprocal exchange be-
tween societal groups and a political party depends, in part, on
the economic independence of brokers from the state. Future
work should further explore the factors that sustain groups’
partisan bias even when parties are nonprogrammatic and
nonideological. From a policy perspective, the study offers a
cautionary tale of how increased political competition may
lead incumbents to adopt policies that may carry short-term
electoral gains but arguably at the expense of longer term de-
velopment goals.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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